مي سمية جيدة البلاد
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this led down to the Captain's cabin, to which there was a moderately broad stair case. In the cabin there was a ta- ble, which was covered with a red cloth the last time I saw it. The cabin had air ports, about four inches in diameter. In the first place, the poop cabin was entirely carried away by the collision; it was swept entirely into the sea; thon I saw that the whole starboard quarter and stern wore cut off. I was not down in the Captain's cabin, and caunot say how large a broach was made in it, or can I describe the breach. I should think the breach must have extended the whole breadth of the ship. I suppose the stair-guse leading to the Captain's cabin must have boon cut off, as the Oneida was struck forward of that. I dont know how the Captain got on deck. I did not go and look over to ascertain the extent of this breach in the Oneida's stern. I think the Onesda ran about two miles after the collision before sinking but, after reflecting again, I have no means of judging the distance run. I cannot say how far sho had run. I should judge that her propeller must have been injured, but I dont know. I should think her engines were not injured. I should like to say that I don't think the Oneila wont two miles after the collision. I don't know how far she wont, and had no means of judging. The wheel was out away by the collision. The wind was from N. N. H. to N. E. principally N. B., force from 4 to 5; the Kanonsaki light bore & a point on the starboard bow from the time of sighting it to the time of the collision, except when I alter- ed course by reason of the ship sagging, when it was brought up nearly ahead. At no time before the collision, did it hear upon ny port bow. It is a rule of the U. S. Navy, when the officer of the watch alters course, that he informs the uavigating officer and the Captain of it, but on this occasion I understood the Captain was not to be dis- turbed. I did notify the navigator and he came on deck. He stayed on deck about 10 miantos. When one of the U. S. Navy vessels is in a dangerous place the navigators post of duty is on deck. When any dangor from a collision is ap- prehended, his post is aleo on deck, and if he considers. it necessary, he can take charge of the ship. When I Arat saw the Bombay's light, it was a little to the left of Kanonsaki light, then it went to the right of the light. As it was roauding the point. I saw the starboard green light of the Bombay; it bore one point on the starboard bow. Twenty of the officers of the Oneidu were lost and ninety five men. The Oneida arrived on the China station at the end of 1887. The Bombay was one mile off when I noticed her heading for the Oneida. I could not have avoided her then by patting our helm aport. When you see the mass head and green light of an approaching steamer, the rule is to star- board the helta in order to give the other steamer a wide berth this I did when I first saw the Bombay's lights. As far as I know, the helm was starboarded at the time of collision; at least I had given no orders to change it.
To Mr. BARNARD. The name of the lookout on the star- board forecastle is William Brittany, ordinary seaman, the man at the weather wheel is named Albert Rugaart sea- man; those are all of the lookouts who were saved. I was in charge of the deck when we first saw the Bombay's lights as officer of the watch. I was in charge of the ship at the time of the collision. We passed within three cables length of the light ship I should think. When I took charge of the deck, we were steering for Kanonsaki light--for a mo- ment that light was brought to bear almost right ahead. I dont know if Perry Island was in eight at that time. I did not know Perry's Island. I am unacquainted with the land in that locality. I am not supposed to know the land; as officer of the watch I am supposed to know the course but not the peculiarities of the land. I thought the ship was sagging only from the fact of of bringing the light more ahead, not from the position of the land from west- ward.
I thought we were approaching the land to the westward. I could see the land, and the general outline of it. At that time I should think the land to the westward was something between 4 or 5 miles distant. I was aware that we could approach it pretty close. I was at that dis- tance when we sighted the Bombay's lights; we made the lights one point on the starboard how; the other vessel was steering up toward Yokohama, her course would have taken her somewhere up by the lightship. I imagined that vessel was going to pass as on the starboard side, be- cause she was so far in toward the western shore, and we wera some way out. We left Yokohama about 515 F.M., and came into collision with the Bomboy at 6.45 P.M. Our time would have been the same as H. M. S. Ocean's time. When we saw all three lights of the Bombay we were about a mile off. We were so close together, and approaching so rapidly, that I thought that if we ported our helma we should collide; we were approaching each other at the rate of seventeen miles an hour I should judge. Under the circumstances our mixen and gaff topsails would be against our port helm; it is doubtful whether we should have had time to get them în hefore the collision Allowing the vessel had no caurass on, and in fine wea ther, without canvass, and ander steam, I don't know how long it would have taken the Oneida to turn rozed. When I saw the Bombay's green light it did not occur to
me that ber red light must be just on the point of opening. The Oneida usually went about seven and a half knots; the hoilers and engines were out of order. When the speed was reported to me, it did not occur to me to doubt who- ther we were going so slowly. I didn't have the log hove the second time, as I didn't think it necessary, as I took the word of the midshipman, and didn't wish him to think that I imagined he didn't know how to heave the log that was the first time he had ever hovo a log on board our ship. It is possible and even probable that he might have missed a knot under those circumstances. I thought the Oneida might be going seven and a half knots, no vro. The engines were not going fast, and there wasn't much wind. The engines did not turn so fast aftor sis o'clock as they did before. I am not aware that it is usual for vessels to keep on the starboard side in a narrow ohan- nol. It did not occur to me that the Bombay might be too close to the western shore, and wauting to come out. Our engines were going but not very rapidly at the time of nollision. No change was made in speed. I did not hear our hail answered. My purpose in ordering them to shorton sail was to decrease the ships head way, knowing that we ought not to be under sail after collision. It was not vory long, say five minutes after the collision, that we first discovered that the Oneida was making water danger ously; her sails were clewed up within the five minutos. I hadn't found out that the rudder wus damaged at the time that the ordor was given to shorten sail; it was about two minutes after this that I found all the steering gear was out of order. The chief engineer must have re- ported that the ship was making water. Steps were taken to head the ship off to the western shore. I don't know that it occurred to any one to beach the vessel on the Saratoga Spit. I believe that Mr. Moldaur thought we were below the spit. I didn't know; I hadn't seen the buoy. Our standard compass was on the poop, underneath the spanker boom, amidship. I think the navigating officer know where he was with regard to the Saratoga Spit; he must have taken the hearings, he was always taking bear- ings when we were under weigh. I don't know whether he took the bearings of Perry's island or not. Though seeing only one light, I judged that the Bombay was running nearly parallel to us; immediately before the collision I know that she must have starboarded her helmu, as I could plainly see the Bombay's head go to port. The Bombay was running across our bows, and the Oneida was not running across the Bombay's bows. I don't want it under- stood for a moment, that I admit that I crossed his bowe. There were no flash-lights, blue lights or any kind of signals on the bridge--it would not be as easy to get a rocket ready as to get ammunition from the magazine, as the rocket would have to be fastened to the stick. I don't think the rockets could have been got ready as soon as the gun was ready for fring. The Oneida's proper comple- ment of boats was six, which I consider would be sufficient to save all hands, some of them would have carried pro- visions and some not. When we left Yokohama we had not that complement; we were short three serviceable boats. I should judge that the layush and the 2nd cutter would each carry, say 45, and that the 3rd entter would carry over 30; if we had had our proper complement of boats, we could not have carried the whole ship'e company without the gig, with all the boats we might just bave saved all the ship's company, We carried spare booms all lashed outside, none were lashed inside:-no order was given to cut away spars or to prepare for wreck. The order to take to the boats was not given till say, 12 minutes after The men the collision. I didn't hear it given myself.
I believe the order was were not told off to any boati given to the life boat's crew to clear away the lifebost. lf the Oneila had struck on A rock instead of coming into collision we might have saved moro mom, aa wa might have had the gig--the third cutter also would have held moro men than she had. I did not hoar Captain Williams say, "you have the Admiral to thank for this." I heard that Captain Williams said "I have asked for boats and can't get them”—I couldn't swear to any one having been wounded on board the Oneida, I heard and I think that the orderly at the cabin hatch had his nose cut off, and that the man at the lee wheel was killed--there were two men at the wheel at the time of the collision, besides a quartermaster. The Oneida carried two Surgeons. I don't think that the Surgeons knew that the men were hurt-I did'at know it. I only heard of it afterwards-the doctor of a vessel not being an executive officer is not supposed to go away in charge of a boat unless by special authority; in the event of a boat being sent away on duty one of the line officers is always supposed to go in charge. I suppose we were about ton minutos by the wreck before we pulled away. did not see the Doctor's boat during that time; the doctor pulled off to a junk. I cannot tell whether he might have saved any men had he stayed by the wreck. There was no order given to the Doctor to leave the ship that I know of. Our spanker boom was fastened to she mizen mast by a goose neck of iron.
Aljourned till nine 4.M. to-morrow;
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SEVENTH DAY,
THURSDAY, 3RD
FEBRUARY,
1870.
Proceedings resumed 9 A.M. Thursday, 3rd February, 1870.
Examination of Isaac Yates master U. S. N., resumed. TO THE COURT. I cannot say whether any hearing's were taken at 6 P.M. they would have been entered in my log at 8 F.M. I suppose that Mr. Moldaur had taken bear- ing's. When I altered the course to S. E. and by S. it had nothing to do with the approaching steamer; we headed up to that point slowly and then headed back slowly. I should think this took altogether about 5 minutes. Mr. Moldaur remarked that we could not go any more to port, as he thought we were as close over to the eastern shore as ho thought it safe to go. There is no rule of the road in our ser- vice, to my knowledge, that in passing a narrow channel, a vessel keeps on the starboard side. Having a ship on my starboard side, I am aware that it is my duty to keep out of her way. I saw her three lights, when about a mile distant 3 points on our starboard bow. I did not port be canse she was well on the starboard how, and I thought for an instant and saw that I could not port my helm. I could not port because I thought we should have struck end on -besides she was on my starboard side, and the rule is to starboard your helm. I had previously seen the green light only; and by the steamer opening out three lights, I was aware that she was porting her belt. There is no impression on my mind that I should have ported my helm then as she was an our starboard side, and should have kept to star- board-the starboard lookout man is saved and also the man who had the weather wheel. The leadsmen are not saved. The magazine of the Oneida is in the forward part of the ship; the shell rooms are also forward: the signal lights were kept I believe in the signal quartermaster's room. Our signals were patent signals of different colors. I cau- not say where the signal quartermaster's room was. I know it was somewhere forward. After the collision there was no- thing to prevent our getting up signal lights for making a signal. The key of that room was kept by the signal quarter master, the rockets however were under charge of the gun- ner's mate. I dont know where they were kept: they were not kept in the shell room. The only store rooms aft were in connection with the paymaster department. The tiller was carried away; everything shaft the wheel was cut off, the mizen mast was standing. The wheel was forward of the poop, I did not myself see that the tiller was gone, but I judged that the head of the rudder was gone also. This f know: that the ship was unmanageable. We had a tiller on the spar deck and another within the Captain's cabin. We did not try to steer by the second tiller; the Captain's cabin was all smashed up, and we could not get there; the Captain I believe, was lifted up by two men. I did not try to go down to the Captain's cabin and steer by the second tiller: The Boatswain was told to try and get the relieving tackle ship- ped. He is saved. Had I been able to steer the ship. I should have tried to bring her up on the spit. I cannot say where the water first came in from. Just before I saw the ship was beading E. by N., I saw the lighthouse on our starboard beam. The signal quartermaster is not saved. The steam whistle was not blowing when we hailed, all was silent on our ship. 1 have been a master since the 25th of March last
I was 23 last November. I have had churge of the deck at sea ever since I have been in the Oneida. I have always taken my regular turn. When I first joined the Oneida I was an ensign. I joined the Oneida on the 6th August 1868 at Nagasaki. I first saw the Bombay's light to the eastward of Kanonsaki light; after that I saw it to the westward, my ship was heading up to S. E. by S. when } first saw the Bombay's light on our starboard how. It was still on our starboard bow when we got on our course 8. by E. 4 E. I did not see the bombay's light on our port bow the whole time; when I got on our proper course the Bombay's light was to the westward of Kunobsaki light. She was on our starboard how, a long distance off, and close into the western shore. should judge that she went round Kanonsaki and then steered in toward the shore. I can't exactly explain how she could have been in towards the western shore. When I first saw her green
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light she was a point on our starboard bow. When I saw all her lights she was three points on our starboard how ; the navigating officer was down below for his dinner. can't say why we fired the lee guu instead of the weather gua. I don't know if the Bombay could have heard the weather gun better; perhaps she might, but I think she ought to have heard it any way we were short of the launch, which we carried in the cradle at the starboard waist, the second cutter which we carried on the starboard quarter, hoisted up abreast the main rigging; the dingy was quite useless. I came away in the first cutter which was carried on the port side. The doctor came away in the catter which was carried on the port quarter. No other officer who was on duty at the time was saved except the boatswain. The port binnacle was forward of the wheel, so that a man standing at the wheel could look right into it. The wheel was situated just forward of the cabin hatch. I think that Mr. Stewart hailed immediately after the collision had taken place, and that the whistle was blown directly after that. The whistle was not blown before the collision took place. The Oneida's steam whistle was a large one, and of a very loud tone. I could not distinguish any figure on board the Bombay. I could see a good many lights on board her. I was standing on the starboard side of the bridge at the time of the collision. I was looking over my right shoulder to see how she was going to strike us. When I looked over my shoulder I saw lights on her deck, but I did not see either of her side lights; the side lights are not allowed to show aft. It was such a short time that I can- not say how long it was after I lost sight of her green light that she struck us. After we had opened all the Bombay's three lights, we lost her red light. "When I saw all her three lights, I gave the order to starboard our helm. I have not at any time state as follows, viz: that I first saw the Bombay's bright and red light a little on the port bow, and that I gave the order to port the Oneida's helm, but that Captain Williams came on deck immediately after wards and said; no, no,-starboard your helm, always starboard," and that in my opinion the Oneida was altoge. ther in fault with regard to the collision. I did not make use of my speaking trumpet to hail the other vessel. The shock of the collision was severe; it was not lighter than I had anticipated. I could have given the order to stop the engines. It did not occur to me to stop the engines when I saw the collision was inevitable, as I wanted if possible to get by. At no time before the collision did I want
1 did send for Mr. to stop the engines. Moldaur when I saw the vessel heading for me--all her three lights. I saw him on the bridge ladder just as the ships were striking. I told the boy to toll Mr. Moldaur that I wanted him. I did not tell the boy to tell him that we were in danger of colliding, as he always came up night or day when sent for. When I saw the Bombay's three lights I knew that she kept porting, but, nevertheless, I kept starboarding as that was the rule of the road. Even when I see another ship making a mistake, I consider it my duty to abide by the rules, and not to use my own discre tion. The main topsail, main trysail, spanker and gaff- topsails were all set, and would act against the port helm, so that she would not have felt her helm so soon as if she had had no sails set; on the other hand these sails would act in favour of the starboard helm. The Oneida's pe- culiarity was that you always had to keep a weather helm, when the aft sails were set, as she had an inclination to come up to the wind. Even with the wind on her quarter there would be some difficulty in keeping her off the wind, -she would carry some weather helm whenever the spanker was set. She carried a weather helm when we altered course to S. E. by S. 1 didn't touch the braces at all: the sails were all full then, the wind was pretty aft on our quarter, we always had to keep the yards braced well in, in order to keep her off on her course. The port tacks were hauled on board. I didn't think it prudent to bave the spanker and gaff topsail set, but I didn't like to go against the orders of the navigating officer. I don't know that the main supply of signal lights were kept in the
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